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IS THERE A RIGHT TO TWEET AT YOUR
PRESIDENT?
Nick Reade*
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed the public forum doctrine to
protect the First Amendment rights of speakers in places of assembly and
expression. The doctrine facilitates free expression by restricting the
government’s ability to discriminate against or regulate speech in statecontrolled public forums. In 2019, two federal courts of appeals extended
the doctrine to protect speakers who express themselves in the interactive
spaces that elected politicians control on their personal social media
accounts. In Davison v. Randall, the Fourth Circuit held that a local
official’s Facebook page was a public forum and, therefore, the official could
neither block any Facebook users for posting critical comments nor delete
any such comments. In Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University v. Trump, the Second Circuit held that President Trump had
created a public forum on his Twitter account and likewise could not block
users for criticizing him. This Note proposes that the respective circuit courts
misapplied the public forum doctrine to the elected officials’ social media
accounts and that their rulings unconstitutionally compelled the speech of
Facebook and Twitter. This Note argues that viewing these rulings as
compelled speech adequately protects social media companies’ First
Amendment right to enable users to screen content and that such a right
prevails over the public’s free speech interest in commenting on politicians’
social media accounts.
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INTRODUCTION
In most circumstances, the First Amendment protects private individuals
from government restrictions or regulations on the content of their speech.1
In furtherance of this right, the U.S. Supreme Court has established the public
forum doctrine as a subset of First Amendment jurisprudence, whereby
speakers on state-owned and state-controlled property are free from
government regulation of the content of their speech.2 Although the Supreme
Court recognizes that a public forum may be “metaphysical,”3 the Court has
not yet resolved the extent to which the doctrine may apply to social media.4
As elected officials continue to utilize social media to express themselves
and host opinions from other social media users, the extent to which the
Constitution protects a social media user’s speech from a government
official’s restriction on his or her own social media account is yet
unanswered.
Unlike the protection it provides from government speech restrictions, the
First Amendment does not restrain privately owned entities from using their
powers to restrict and regulate speech as they see fit.5 As privately owned
entities, social media companies retain such First Amendment rights to
regulate speech on their sites.6
In 2019, federal courts were confronted with how to apply the First
Amendment when government officials use social media accounts to exclude
users. In Davison v. Randall,7 the Fourth Circuit held that a Loudoun County
supervisor had created a public forum when she used her official Facebook
page for official government business, and she thereafter violated the First
Amendment when she blocked a constituent from viewing that page and
deleted his disparaging comments.8 A few months later, the Second Circuit
held in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump9
that President Donald Trump had created a public forum on his Twitter
account and thereafter violated several Twitter users’ First Amendment
rights when he blocked them from viewing that account.10 The day after the
Second Circuit issued its ruling, a plaintiff brought suit against New York
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, claiming she had abridged the
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see infra
Part I.C.3 (explaining which categories of content the government may regulate).
3. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
4. See generally Kathleen McGarvey Hidy, Social Media Use and Viewpoint
Discrimination: A First Amendment Judicial Tightrope Walk with Rights and Risks Hanging
in the Balance, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1045, 1081–82 (2019).
5. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019).
6. Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of Facebook,
44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 121 (2014).
7. 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
8. Id. at 682, 687.
9. 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
10. Id. at 237–38.
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plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by blocking him on Twitter.11 Thus,
aggrieved parties from across the political spectrum are seeking to use the
public forum doctrine to prevent elected officials from excluding them on
social media.
It is important to examine the countervailing First Amendment rights at
issue in these lawsuits. When politicians use their social media accounts, it
is unclear whether they create public forums in which the First Amendment
protects the public’s right to express viewpoints without restriction.
Alternatively, the public’s First Amendment interest may ultimately yield to
privately owned social media companies’ First Amendment right to decide
what speech to allow or restrict on their websites, including on politicians’
accounts. If the latter is the better way to analyze these scenarios, then
rulings that require elected officials to preserve disparaging speech on their
social media accounts may violate the social media companies’ First
Amendment right against compelled speech.
Part I of this Note provides a background on the relevant First Amendment
law at issue: the public forum doctrine, government speech, constitutional
content-based regulations of speech, and compelled speech. Part II explains
the facts of Knight and Davison and details the circuit courts’ application of
the public forum doctrine in each case. Part III presents the competing
arguments over whether the courts appropriately applied the public forum
doctrine and assesses the claim that social media companies have a private
First Amendment right that protects their content from government intrusion.
Part IV details why the circuit courts misapplied the public forum doctrine to
the social media accounts of elected officials, explains why the rulings may
have unconstitutionally compelled the speech of social media companies, and
explores why such ramifications matter in the modern world of politics on
social media.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: PUBLIC FORUM , COMPELLED SPEECH, AND
RELATED DOCTRINES
The public forum doctrine is a subset of First Amendment jurisprudence
that protects speakers from government curtailments of speech in places
traditionally devoted to expression or in places that are maintained by the
government for expressive purposes.12 Part I.A explains how and why
government action is necessary for a court to find that speech regulation
violates the First Amendment. Part I.B discusses the public forum doctrine
11. Kate Sullivan, Ex-NY Assemblyman Suing Ocasio-Cortez for Blocking Him on Twitter
Cites Trump Case, CNN (July 10, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/10/
politics/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-sued-twitter-user/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G99Y26XY]. The plaintiff subsequently settled the lawsuit after Representative Ocasio-Cortez
relented and unblocked him from viewing her account. Michael Gold, Ocasio-Cortez
Apologizes for Blocking Critic on Twitter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/nyregion/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-twitter-dovhikind.html [https://perma.cc/F2FM-L3HD].
12. Dawn Carla Nunziato, From Town Square to Twittersphere: The Public Forum
Doctrine Goes Digital, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 21 (2019).
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in detail and outlines the tripartite framework the Supreme Court has
developed to apply the public forum doctrine in different factual
circumstances. Part I.C explores the modern application of the doctrine in
telecommunications settings, its overlap with the concept of government
speech, and the categories of speech that are amenable to content-based
government regulation. Finally, Part I.D explains the compelled speech
doctrine and the First Amendment’s protection of editorial control and
judgment.
A. State Action
A speaker who claims her First Amendment rights have been violated must
demonstrate that the state acted to violate her constitutional rights.13 The
First Amendment only protects speakers when their speech has been curtailed
through government action.14 A state acts not only through its legislature
and executive but through “judicial authorities” as well.15 Therefore, a court
may find sufficient state action in a First Amendment case when a court
issues a ruling.16
First Amendment claims will fail if a plaintiff cannot show that the state
was somehow active in the infringement of her expression.17 The First
Amendment does not ordinarily constrain private entities from curtailing
speech18 because private curtailment alone is insufficient to raise a viable
First Amendment claim.19 A private entity can only be considered a state
actor amenable to First Amendment constraints if it (a) performs a
“traditional, exclusive public function,” (b) is compelled by the government
to take a particular action, or (c) acts jointly with the government.20 If,
however, in the context of a public forum First Amendment claim, the
government controls a privately owned venue, then any speech infringement
that occurs at the venue carries sufficient state action for a First Amendment
claim.21
B. The Public Forum Doctrine
Public forums are certain locations or communication channels where free
expression is so fundamental that the government has sharply limited powers
to regulate speech therein.22
In all public forums, no viewpoint
13. See Alex Hadjian, Comment, Social Media and the Government: Why It May Be
Unconstitutional for Government Officials to Moderate Their Social Media, 51 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 361, 369 (2018).
14. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566
(1995).
15. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
16. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
17. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019).
18. Id.
19. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566.
20. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928.
21. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554–55 (1975).
22. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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discrimination is allowed.23 In other words, the government is forbidden
from discriminating against or suppressing speech simply because the
government opposes the speaker’s viewpoint.24 The Supreme Court has
recognized three different categories of forums under its public forum
analysis: traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic
or “limited” public forums.25 Each category retains different characteristics,
and each category permits varying levels of speech restrictions.26
1. Traditional Public Forums
The most protected category is the traditional public forum.27 Traditional
forums are places that, either by tradition or government approval, have long
been devoted to assembly or free expression.28 Parks and streets are the
“quintessential” examples of traditional public forums.29
The Supreme Court has recognized that all persons have a constitutionally
protected right to access and express themselves in traditional public
forums.30 Therefore, the government is sharply limited from discriminating
against the content of speech—either its subject matter or viewpoint—in
traditional public forums.31 Except for a narrow group of speech categories
amenable to content-based regulations, the Court applies strict scrutiny when
analyzing content-based government restrictions on speech in traditional
public forums.32 Any such restrictions of speech content in traditional public
forums must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.33 The government may, however, regulate the time, place, or
manner of speech in traditional public forums without violating the First
Amendment.34 Therefore, there are very few circumstances in which the
government may regulate expression within these traditional forums.35
2. Designated Public Forums
Beyond traditional public forums like parks and streets, the Supreme Court
has also recognized “designated” public forums. Designated public forums
are physical locales or channels of communication that have been created or
23. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
24. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 806.
25. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
26. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
27. Id. at 45.
28. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
29. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
30. Id. at 45, 55.
31. Id. at 45.
32. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). See infra Part I.C.3 for
an explanation of government restrictions of certain speech categories that the Court has
deemed constitutional under the First Amendment.
33. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
34. Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas Division, 68
ALA. L. REV. 337, 345 (2016).
35. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 469–70.
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designated by the government as places for expression.36 When the
government seeks to regulate speech in designated public forums, it is subject
to the same limitations as it is in traditional public forums.37 Therefore, the
government may regulate time, place, and manner of speech restrictions
within designated public forums, but any content-based restrictions must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.38
Once it has created a designated public forum, the government is not
obliged to keep it open indefinitely for discussion and communication.39 But
as long as it preserves a location as a public forum for free expression, the
government is bound by those First Amendment restrictions.40
For instance, the Court held in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad 41
that, as a place of expression, a privately owned municipal theater under lease
to the City of Chattanooga was a designated public forum so long as it was
controlled by the city.42 Thus, private ownership of a location or channel did
not preclude a finding that the theater was a designated public forum.43 The
city’s leasehold of the privately owned theater created state control sufficient
to apply the public forum doctrine.44
A key determination in many public forum analyses is whether the
government has actively designated a place as a public forum.45 The Court
has examined both the government’s intentions in creating the location and
the presence of expressive activity within the location to determine if it has
been designated as a public forum.46 This section will examine these two
analyses in turn.
A government may only establish a designated public forum through
affirmative action, accompanied by government intent.47 Designated forums
are not created through inaction or by merely permitting some sort of limited
discussion.48 The Court will not find that a designated public forum exists if
it concludes that the government had no intention to establish a public
forum.49 Therefore, if a piece of government property organically becomes
the site of debates and discussions, the Court will not deem it a public forum
without a concurrent finding of government intent to establish it as a place
for expression.50

36. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry,
460 U.S. at 45.
37. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
38. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
42. Id. at 555–56.
43. Id. at 556.
44. Id. at 556–58.
45. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 803.
50. Id. at 802–04.
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To determine if the necessary intent existed to designate a forum for public
assembly and debate, the Supreme Court has looked to the “policy and
practice” of the government in the creation of the forum.51 In Widmar v.
Vincent,52 the Court concluded that, because a state university had made its
meeting facilities available to all student groups, the university had intended
to open the university’s spaces to all students regardless of viewpoint.53
Therefore, the Court found the university had exhibited the intent necessary
to designate the meeting facility as a public forum.54
By contrast, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc.,55 the Court found that a federal employee charity drive was not a
designated public forum because the government had not intended to create
a medium for expressive activity when it initiated the drive.56 In Perry
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,57 the Court held that,
because a public school had only allowed select organizations to access its
internal mailboxes, which were otherwise unreachable by the general public,
the government had not intended to make the mailboxes public forums.58
Therefore, without the requisite intent, the school had not created a
designated public forum.59
Designated public forums are places the government has created for free
expression.60 The Court thus examines the nature of the property and its
“compatibility with expressive activity” to determine if it has been
designated as a public forum.61 If a nontraditional forum has qualities
characteristic of a place for free expression, the Court is more likely to deem
it a designated public forum.62 Places that the Court has found to be
designated public forums because they facilitated expressive activity include
theaters,63 university meeting facilities,64 and school board meetings.65
However, the presence of expressive activity alone does not transform a
place or communication channel into a public forum with First Amendment
protections.66 If the government limits access to a particular forum,
implements policies in the forum that limit free expression, or otherwise
operates the forum for a purpose other than expressive activity, the Court will

51. Id. at 802.
52. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
53. Id. at 267–68.
54. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
55. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
56. Id. at 805.
57. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
58. Id. at 47.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 45.
61. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
62. See id. at 802–03.
63. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
64. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–70 (1981).
65. City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S.
167, 175–76 (1976).
66. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805.
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not hold that the location is a public forum, even if expression occurs
therein.67
3. Limited Public Forums
The final category of public forum recognized by the Court is the
nonpublic or “limited” public forum.68 A limited public forum is a piece of
government property that is not traditionally used for free expression and has
not been designated by the government for such use.69 As in traditional and
designated public forums, the government may effectuate time, place, and
manner regulations in limited public forums without violating the First
Amendment.70 But unlike traditional and designated forums, the government
may limit expression in limited public forums to a circumscribed set of topics
or for a particular set of speakers.71 Therefore, the government may impose
reasonable content restrictions on expression to conform to the forum’s
predetermined subject matter parameters.72
Such government restrictions on expression in limited public forums need
not be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest because
the First Amendment does not mandate unfettered access to or use of limited
public forums.73 Restrictions on a limited public forum for certain speakers
or to particular topics need not be “the most reasonable” to be constitutionally
permissible.74 Rather, they can merely be reasonable exclusions.75
Nonetheless, viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in limited public
forums, as it is in traditional and designated forums.76 If a speaker addresses
a topic that is otherwise allowed under the content parameters of the limited
public forum, the government cannot exclude that speaker from expressing
herself merely because she presents an opinion contrary to the government’s
preferences.77 Such a restriction would be an instance of impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.78 This prohibition of viewpoint discrimination
remains true even if the government has created the forum itself.79

67. See id. at 803–05 (holding that a charity campaign for federal employees was not a
designated forum even though it involved open expression for charitable solicitations).
68. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
69. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
70. Id.
71. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
72. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
73. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
74. Id. at 808.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 806.
77. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993).
78. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
79. Id.
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C. The Public Forum Doctrine’s Application to Telecommunications and
Its Intersection with Other First Amendment Doctrine
The public forum doctrine is an intricate subset of First Amendment law,
and its application in court has only grown more complex as technology has
shifted society’s understanding of forums. This section describes how the
Supreme Court has applied the doctrine to emerging technological forums
like cable television and the internet, how the doctrine intersects with the
government speech doctrine, and the content-based government speech
regulations the Court has held to be constitutional.
1. Public Forums in Telecommunications
The Supreme Court’s public forum analysis applies most clearly to speech
that occurs in settings that individuals physically occupy, such as parks,80
university facilities,81 or theaters.82 It also applies to discrete spaces where
speech can be distributed in physical form, like school mailboxes.83 The
Court even applied it to events, such as a fundraising charitable drive.84
The Court has expanded its public forum analysis and applied it to
“metaphysical” areas or channels where people exchange ideas.85
Nevertheless, the Court has struggled to apply the public forum doctrine as
modern technology has created new channels of communication that operate
as forums of speech. Although the Court held as early as 1997 that speech
communicated via the internet constituted speech protected by the First
Amendment,86 it has not yet solidified the extent to which the public forum
doctrine protects speech over the internet or other modern avenues of
communication.
Writing for the majority in Packingham v. North Carolina,87 Justice
Anthony Kennedy left open the possibility that social media sites may
eventually be viewed as a public forums because they are the most effective
modern vehicle for expressing ideas.88 Concurring twenty-one years earlier
in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,89
Justice Kennedy wrote that, because they had been established by the
government to induce the free exchange of ideas, public access cable
channels are designated public forums, even though their communications
are transmitted over privately owned cables.90 Despite Justice Kennedy’s

80. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939).
81. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–70 (1981).
82. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554–55 (1975).
83. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983).
84. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 790 (1985).
85. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); see also Lyrissa
Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1995 (2011).
86. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
87. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
88. See id. at 1737.
89. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
90. Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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reasoning, the Court declined to answer the question of whether public access
channels were public forums.91
However, in 2019, the Court held in Manhattan Community Access Corp.
v. Halleck 92 that a public access cable channel was not a public forum,
although the channel provided a medium for anyone who wanted to produce
content and air it on the channel.93 Consistent with past precedent, the Court
held that the cable company’s provision of a forum for expression did not
automatically create a public forum.94 The Court held that even if a private
entity provides a forum for communication, as the local cable company had,
it does not create a public forum because it is neither a state actor nor acting
with the government to provide the forum.95 Therefore, because it is not a
public forum, the private cable company did not violate the First Amendment
when it restricted or regulated speech on its forum.96
2. Government Speech
Another First Amendment doctrine deserves explanation for greater
context: government speech. The Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment restricts government regulation and abridgment of private
speech.97 It does not, however, restrict the regulation of the government’s
own speech or messaging.98 Therefore, the government does not engage in
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination if it selectively determines the
content of its messages at the explicit exclusion of contrary messages.99 For
example, when the government publicly encourages vaccination or recycling
programs, it need not include the views of antivaccination or antirecycling
advocates.100
It is not always clear when expression comes directly from the
government—and is protected from First Amendment scrutiny—and when
expression is merely hosted by the government in a public forum—and is
amenable to claims of viewpoint discrimination.101 A recent Supreme Court
case highlights the importance of this distinction.

91. Id. at 742–43 (majority opinion).
92. 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
93. Id. at 1930–31.
94. Id. at 1930.
95. Id. at 1930–31.
96. Id. at 1934.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
99. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245–46
(2015). Some scholars contend that the government is nonetheless constrained from
advocating certain viewpoints by the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. See, e.g.,
Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 747
(2011); see also Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 648–50
(2013).
100. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246.
101. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 470.
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In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,102 a social
group in Texas called the Sons of Confederate Veterans applied to the state’s
Department of Motor Vehicles Board to have the state produce a specialty
license plate displaying the Confederate flag.103 After the board rejected the
proposed plate, the group sued, arguing that the rejection constituted
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because the application process
was a public forum.104
The Court rejected the notion that the license plate application process was
a public forum.105 The Court instead found that the license plate process was
an instance of government speech because, along with a few other factors,
the state directly controlled the production and distribution of the plates.106
Because it was government speech, no First Amendment violation could be
implicated.107
Thus, the key factor distinguishing the government speech doctrine from
the public forum doctrine is that the former covers speech expressed by the
government, whereas the latter covers instances of speech expressed by a
private person within a space under government control.108
3. Free Speech Exceptions
Not all private speech is protected from government interference.109
Although the First Amendment protects the content of most private speech
from government regulation and subjects most such regulations to strict
scrutiny, a few narrow and well-defined categories of private speech are
constitutionally amenable to content-based government regulation.110
The categories of speech that a state may restrict include incitements to
violence, obscenity, libelous words, and “‘fighting’ words.”111 The Supreme
Court has made clear that a government restriction of the content of speech
must address one of these excludable categories to comply with the First
Amendment112 and that a statute that regulates such speech must be narrowly
drawn and strictly limited to survive judicial scrutiny.113
The state may make content-based restrictions on these categories of
speech in public forums as well, where most private speech is usually
102. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
103. Id. at 2245.
104. Id. at 2245, 2250.
105. Id. at 2248–50.
106. Id. at 2248–49.
107. Id. at 2245–46; see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 465, 481
(2009) (holding that a town did not violate the First Amendment when it rejected a proposed
erection of a religious monument in a public park because such privately financed projects
displayed on public property are government speech, not private expression within a public
forum).
108. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 469.
109. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971).
110. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
111. Id. at 572.
112. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
113. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
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protected from government encroachment.114 For example, the government
may restrict “‘fighting’ words” expressed on a sidewalk—a traditional public
forum—because such speech is not protected by the First Amendment.115
The Court has emphasized that these exceptions to the First Amendment’s
protection from state regulation of speech content are narrow.116 In Cohen
v. California,117 the Court explicitly rejected a state’s ability to restrict
“offensive” speech in public places if it does not fall into one of the
aforementioned categories.118 In other words, the First Amendment protects
against government regulation of private speech that is merely offensive.119
But because the First Amendment does not apply to private curtailments
of speech, nothing in the Constitution limits private entities from restricting
speech as they see fit or setting their own rules about tolerable speech.120
Speech does not have to fall into one of these narrow categories if a private
entity wishes to restrict it.121 A private entity may restrict speech merely
because the entity finds it offensive.122
D. Compelled Speech
The final First Amendment doctrine relevant to assess whether elected
officials may constitutionally block users on social media is the compelled
speech doctrine.
1. Prohibition Against Compulsion to Display Certain Content
The crucial case to understand the compelled speech doctrine is Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,123 in which the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Florida statute aimed at giving political candidates equal
space to voice their opinions in print newspapers.124 Florida’s “right of
reply” statute gave a candidate for elected office the right to demand that a
newspaper print the candidate’s own opinion if the newspaper had previously
published opinion pieces that criticized the candidate.125 The Miami Herald
challenged the statute’s constitutionality after a candidate for the Florida
House of Representatives brought suit when the newspaper refused to print
his editorial after publishing one by his opponent.126

114. See id. at 574 (permitting government restrictions on “fighting words” espoused on a
sidewalk).
115. Id. at 569–70, 573–74.
116. Id. at 571–72.
117. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 18, 26.
120. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
121. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1791, 1853–54 (1992).
122. See id.
123. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
124. Id. at 244, 258.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 243–44.
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In finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court emphasized that the First
Amendment not only protected the press from government restrictions on
what they could print but also insulated them from government intervention
to force them to print a particular message.127 Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court found that the statute effectively directed a publisher to print a
particular opinion, intruding impermissibly into the editorial discretion of the
newspaper’s editors.128
The Supreme Court has extended First Amendment protections from
compelled speech beyond print publishing to several other circumstances and
settings. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,129 the Court
struck down a West Virginia resolution compelling students and teachers to
physically salute the American flag and verbally recite the Pledge of
Allegiance.130 The Court found that the resolution was unconstitutional
because the First Amendment forbids a state from compelling conformity to
any particular belief or ideology.131 On similar grounds, the Court has held
that the government cannot compel a person to display an ideological sign on
private property.132 Such a compelled expression of ideology or viewpoint
is prohibited by the First Amendment.133
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,134
the Court found that the organizers of Boston’s Saint Patrick’s Day parade
were protected by the First Amendment when they selectively chose the
parade’s participants.135 When the organizers of the parade excluded a local
gay, lesbian, and bisexual group from marching in the parade, the group
brought suit under a Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute.136 On appeal,
the Supreme Court found that, because marching in such a parade is an
expressive activity, state law could not require parade organizers to include
groups whose views the organizers did not wish to disseminate.137 Thus,
even if a state disapproves of a “speaker’s” exclusion of another’s expression,
the First Amendment prohibits the state from compelling that speaker to
include the expression.138
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,139 the Court
held that the First Amendment protects corporations’ freedom of editorial
discretion from intrusion into their dissemination of information.140 The
Court ruled that a regulation requiring a public utility company to include in
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 258.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 642.
Id.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
Id.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Id. at 570.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 576.
See id. at 581.
475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 16.

2020]

A RIGHT TO TWEET AT THE PRESIDENT?

1487

its quarterly newsletter an advocacy group’s criticisms of the company
impermissibly interfered with the discretion of the corporation to choose
what not to say.141
However, the Court applies the doctrine differently to different channels
of communication depending on the relevant technological considerations.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,142 the Court rejected a radio
broadcaster’s allegations that the fairness doctrine violated the First
Amendment.143 The fairness doctrine was a set of regulations issued by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that, in part, required
broadcasters to provide equal airtime to individuals if they wished to respond
to personal attacks aired by the broadcaster.144 Although the regulation at
issue was strikingly similar to the statute the Court would find
unconstitutional in Tornillo five years later, the Court held that, in the context
of radio broadcasting, it did not unconstitutionally compel the broadcasters’
speech.145
These diverging holdings on similar speech-regulating statutes depend in
part on the different science of the media involved. The science and
technology of radio waves is such that only one radio frequency can carry a
particular broadcast in a geographic region.146 Due to this technological
reality, the government must award a monopolistic license to one broadcaster
for each frequency in a geographic area.147 The Court in Red Lion reasoned
that in return for granting a broadcaster a monopoly on a scarce resource,
such as a radio frequency, the government could require the broadcaster to
give public issues equal airtime.148 In essence, because radio broadcasters’
monopolistic power could potentially preclude a free exchange of ideas, the
fairness doctrine was a necessary and constitutional compulsion of speech.149
The scarcity and licensing at issue in Red Lion is absent for publishing and
newspapers, which is a critical reason why the Court reached a different
conclusion in Tornillo.150
Similarly, the Court held in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC151
that the government could constitutionally compel speech and interfere in

141. Id. at 11–13.
142. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
143. Id. at 386, 389–90.
144. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (1989). The FCC later repealed the
fairness doctrine in a 1987 administrative decision that was upheld by the D.C. Circuit. See
generally id.
145. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391.
146. Adrian Cronauer, The Fairness Doctrine: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 47 FED.
COMM. L.J. 51, 58 (1994).
147. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 386. See generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
151. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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editorial discretion if such compulsion was authorized to ensure market
competition, rather than to dictate the content of such speech.152
Such compulsion was also at the heart of the Court’s decision in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.153 In PruneYard, the Court rejected
a claim that California had violated a private shopping mall’s First
Amendment rights by requiring the mall to host petitioners and canvassers.154
California’s state constitution prohibited private properties, such as the
mall, from excluding pamphlet distributors.155 The Court distinguished this
state compulsion from past findings of unconstitutional compelled speech
because the California constitution neither forced the mall owner to display
a particular ideological message nor “intru[ded] into the function of editors”
that was at issue in Tornillo.156 The Court came to this conclusion because
the owner of a commercial space commands no such editorial function.157
In addition, the Court recognized the state’s authority to expand individual
free speech rights onto private property, beyond what the First Amendment
requires.158 Therefore, because the pamphlet distributors were exercising
speech protected by the California constitution, if not by the First
Amendment, the Court rejected the mall owner’s contention that he had been
unconstitutionally compelled to host their speech on his property.159
2. Compelled Speech in the Age of Social Media
Just as it has in the application of the public forum doctrine, the digital era
has presented new challenges for the application of the compelled speech
doctrine. The Communications Decency Act of 1996160 (CDA) was enacted
in 1996 to grant immunity to internet platforms (“internet computer services”
or ICSs) for illegal content posted by third-party users (“internet content
providers” or ICPs) on their sites.161 The CDA states that no ICS will “be
treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another”
ICP.162 For example, internet platforms do not incur liability for defamatory

152. Id. at 643 (holding that content-neutral regulations requiring cable television
companies to carry broadcast television stations were constitutional because the regulations
did not compel speech according to the speech’s content).
153. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
154. Id. at 88.
155. Id. at 79.
156. Id. at 88.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 81.
159. Id.
160. Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). An ICS or internet platform merely provides the online
forum for other users (i.e., the ICPs) to create content and communicate with other ICPs but
does not produce content itself. See TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET:
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA
18–19 (2018).
162. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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or libelous content posted by ICPs on their sites.163 Traditional publishers,
on the other hand, are subject to such tort claims as creators of their own
content.164
In addition to granting immunity for the tortious conduct posted by thirdparty ICPs, the CDA immunizes platforms from any liability they might incur
for removing or restricting content posted by ICPs that the platforms deem
obscene, harassing, or excessively violent.165 This ability to remove
unwanted content allows platforms to moderate the content posted on their
sites and recognizes the editorial discretion platforms possess over such
material.166
A social media website is an ICS that allows its users to create their own
personal accounts and interact with other site users who have accounts.167
These sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, enable users with accounts to
express themselves and to interact and communicate with other users.168
In recent years, lower courts have begun to recognize the editorial
discretion held by ICSs and have extended the compelled speech doctrine to
protect the expression of both private social media companies and search
engine companies. In Langdon v. Google, Inc.,169 the District of Delaware
held that Google, the search engine, did not violate the plaintiff’s speech
when it declined to place advertisements for his website on its search
results.170 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Google is a public
forum where his speech could only be narrowly restricted because no state
action existed when Google removed his ads.171 More important, the court
held that compelling Google to place the plaintiff’s ads would trample the
company’s own First Amendment rights.172 Because the First Amendment
protects the editorial discretion to choose “what not to say,” Google could
reject the plaintiff’s ads.173

163. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1001–02 (2008).
164. Id. at 988 n.9.
165. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
166. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007).
167. Michael Hirschorn, About Facebook: By Bringing Order to the Web, Facebook Could
Become as Important to Us as Google, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2007/10/about-facebook/306181/ [https://perma.cc/93HL-T8QE].
168. See, e.g., Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-restricts-freespeech-popular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.cc/A2D5-WE7M]; see also Jenny Rooney,
Twitter’s Brand New Work “Twitter Is” Furthers Platform’s Transparency, Support of
People’s Authentic Expression, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2019, 5:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jenniferrooney/2019/09/09/twitters-new-brand-work-twitter-is-furthers-platformstransparency-support-of-peoples-authentic-expression/ [https://perma.cc/T68T-RJFX].
169. 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
170. Id. at 631.
171. Id. at 629–30.
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97
(1988)).
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In Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc.,174 a district court rejected a plaintiff’s
request seeking a court order to penalize a search engine’s search results
algorithm.175 The court recognized that the decisions made by the
company’s programmers about what information appears on their site and
how to rank and prioritize their search results amounted to editorial discretion
protected from government interference.176 Therefore, issuing the requested
court order would intrude into the search engine’s editorial judgment and
violate its First Amendment rights.177
In La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc.,178 a district court applying Texas state law
dismissed a defamation suit against Facebook after the company failed to
take down a harassing statement a third party had posted and directed at the
plaintiff.179 Citing Tornillo, the court recognized Facebook’s First
Amendment rights to decide what to publish and what not to publish on its
platform and accordingly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.180
Thus, lower courts have begun to give social media companies the editorial
discretion to moderate their content that had traditionally been afforded to
newspapers and publishers.
II. THE SECOND AND FOURTH CIRCUITS HOLD THAT CERTAIN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS’ SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS ARE PUBLIC FORUMS
Part II describes the Second and Fourth Circuits’ recent decisions that
applied the public forum doctrine to the social media accounts of elected
officials. Part II.A details the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Davison and Part
II.B details the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Knight. Then, Part II.C briefly
summarizes a similar case from the Eastern District of Kentucky regarding
former Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin.
A. Davison v. Randall
In 2019, the Fourth Circuit found that the comments section of a Loudoun
County, Virginia official’s Facebook page was a public forum.181 Because
the official used the page to make official announcements and allowed any
Facebook user to post comments, she used state action to create a space for
expression.182 Accordingly, the court ruled that when the official deleted a
negative comment posted by a Loudoun County resident critical of the
official and then prevented the resident from viewing the page, the official
174. 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
175. Id. at 440.
176. Id. at 438–39.
177. Id. at 440, 442.
178. 272 F. Supp. 3d 981 (S.D. Tex. 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17–20565, 2018 WL
1224417 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018).
179. Id. at 995. For an analysis of the difficulty of assessing tort liability for posts on social
media sites and a critique on such sites’ immunity from tort liability, see generally Tushnet,
supra note 163.
180. La’Tiejira, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 991.
181. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682, 687 (4th Cir. 2019).
182. Id. at 687.
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had engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination prohibited in a
public forum.183
Phyllis Randall is a local elected official in Northern Virginia’s Loudoun
County.184 On January 1, 2016, Phyllis Randall was sworn in as the chair of
the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors.185 When she became chair,
Randall created a Facebook page separate from both her personal Facebook
account and the account her campaign used for her election.186 Facebook’s
“pages” are similar to Facebook accounts used by individuals but are
specifically meant to “help businesses, organizations, and brands share their
stories and connect with people.”187
The page listed Randall’s official government email account as an
additional method of contact.188 Given the option to describe the Facebook
page, Randall designated it as a “government official” page.189 She wrote a
post on the page stating that she had established the page to solicit feedback
from “ANY Loudoun citizen.”190 While Randall and her chief of staff
controlled the page’s posted content, Randall “almost exclusively” controlled
the page.191 During her tenure as chair, she posted on the page to notify
followers of forthcoming public meetings and to make official government
announcements.192 Because of Facebook’s interactive features and the
public nature of her account, any Facebook user who followed Randall’s
page could reply directly to Randall’s posts.193
Randall attended a Loudoun County town hall on February 3, 2016.194
Plaintiff Brian Davison attended the town hall as a private citizen and asked
Randall a question about school funding that Randall said was a “set-up
question.”195 After the town hall, Randall posted a summary of the meeting
on her Facebook page.196 As a follower of Randall’s page, Davison posted
a comment directly responding to Randall’s post from his personal Facebook
account.197 At trial, neither party could remember the specifics of the
comment.198 However, Randall remembered feeling that Davison’s
183. Id.
184. Ann E. Marimow, What Does an Elected Official in Virginia Have to Do with Whether
President Trump Can Block People on Twitter?: A Lot., WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2018, 5:30
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/what-does-an-elected-official-invirginia-have-to-do-with-whether-president-trump-can-block-people-on-twitter-alot/2018/11/08/e7bdde58-d635-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/MYG8-SE56].
185. Davison, 912 F.3d at 673.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 673–74.
189. Id. at 674.
190. Id. at 686.
191. Id. at 673.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 686.
194. Id. at 675.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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comment was unnecessarily accusatory and deleted it along with all other
comments replying to her post.199 Randall then banned Davison’s Facebook
account from commenting further on her official page.200 The next day,
Randall rescinded and removed the ban.201 Davison then sued Randall in the
Eastern District of Virginia for viewpoint discrimination.202
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Randall had
violated Davison’s First Amendment rights by blocking him.203 The court
further held that Randall had opened a designated public forum through her
Facebook page and thereby engaged in viewpoint discrimination in violation
of Davison’s First Amendment rights by deleting his accusatory comment.204
The Fourth Circuit held that there was sufficient state action to bring a First
Amendment claim because Randall used the page as a tool of governance to
further her municipal office, even though she had created the page as an
individual.205 Further, because Randall’s page displayed her official title and
government email address, provided important information to the public, and
solicited input on public policy issues, Randall had “clothed the [page] in the
‘power and prestige of [her] state office’” enough to make the page a public
forum.206
Further, and more crucially, the Fourth Circuit held that the comments
section on Randall’s page constituted a designated public forum.207 The
court’s finding turned on two key considerations. First, Randall had created
the page as a vehicle for discussing public issues and explicitly invited
commentary without placing any restrictions on the public’s access to
comment.208 Second, the interactive space that allows any Facebook user to
post a comment on Randall’s page was a classic form of “expressive activity”
that the public forum doctrine is intended to protect.209 Therefore, (1) the
intentional opening of the page (2) by a government official (3) as a place for
free and open expression (4) made the page and its comments section a public
forum.210
The court rejected the notion that the page remained private because of
Facebook’s status as a private entity—rather than a state actor.211 The court
reasoned that because Randall, a public official, maintained significant
control over the page and the comments posted thereon, the page was not

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 676.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 677, 691.
204. Id. at 679–80, 682.
205. Id. at 680.
206. Id. (quoting Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 337 (7th Cir. 1979)).
207. Id. at 682.
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)).
210. Id. at 688.
211. Id. at 683.
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private property beyond the scope of a public forum analysis.212 Although
Facebook, a private entity, allowed Randall to create the page, the court
found that the page was a public forum due in part to a state official’s
significant control.213
B. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump
Similarly, the Second Circuit found that President Trump engaged in
impermissible viewpoint discrimination when he blocked seven Twitter users
from viewing his account because of the political views they expressed.214
Because President Trump had intentionally used his Twitter account for
official government announcements, Trump had created a public forum with
his Twitter account.215
President Trump set up his Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, in 2009,
six years before he announced his candidacy for president.216 He frequently
tweeted in an individual capacity before and throughout his candidacy217 and
continues to post personal opinions as president.218 However, the
“biography” section of President Trump’s account has identified him as the
“45th President of the United States of America” since he took office.219 His
first press secretary stated that Trump’s tweets should be interpreted as
official statements of the president.220 He has used the account to announce
major government personnel decisions221 and changes in executive branch
policy.222 President Trump is primarily responsible for producing the content
of his tweets, although the White House social media director Dan Scavino
also has access to the account and has written many of the tweets sent from
the account.223 There is a separate Twitter account, @POTUS, that the
212. Id.
213. Id. at 683–85.
214. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 234 (2d
Cir. 2019).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 231.
217. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 28, 2014, 8:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/516382177798680576 [https://perma.cc/9VYB8LFD]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 22, 2012, 4:48 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/260482827458592768 [https://perma.cc/4GG3YP7N].
218. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 27, 2019, 8:06 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1122109651087241216 [https://perma.cc/U5AVB9LT].
219. Knight, 928 F.3d at 231.
220. Id.
221. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2019, 8:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/973540316656623616 [https://perma.cc/B6XBXTFG].
222. Knight, 928 F.3d at 232; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26,
2017, 9:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890196164313833472 [https://
perma.cc/3GRD-PMZ5]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017,
8:55 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890193981585444864 [https://
perma.cc/A4PY-RYJ7].
223. Knight, 928 F.3d at 232.
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Trump White House assumed from the Obama administration after President
Trump’s inauguration.224 Nevertheless, President Trump has continued to
use his initially private @realDonaldTrump account as his primary vehicle
for tweeting.225
Twitter has interactive features that allow a user to post a tweet and in turn
allows “followers”226 of the user’s account to reply directly to the tweet.227
This is called a “reply.”228 If the account is public, anybody with a Twitter
account can reply to the tweet with their own comment.229 President Trump
tweets frequently from his public account230 and, with over sixty million
accounts following him, he receives thousands of replies to each tweet he
sends.231
In early 2017, each of the seven plaintiffs individually posted replies
critical of President Trump in direct response to some of his tweets.232
Because of their critical replies, President Trump blocked each of the
plaintiff’s accounts from viewing his account in May and June of 2017.233
Blocking these individual accounts rendered the plaintiffs unable to use those
accounts to read the president’s tweets, read what other Twitter users were
writing in response to the president’s tweets, or write a reply to either the
president or those other users who reply to those tweets.234 As the Second
Circuit noted, blocking the plaintiffs thereby limited their “ability to
converse” with other Twitter users in the long thread of comments that result
from the replies to the president’s tweets.235
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Davison, the Second Circuit held
that there was sufficient state action to create a public forum on President
Trump’s Twitter account and that President Trump had engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by blocking his critics.236 The Second Circuit held that
President Trump’s personal Twitter account is government controlled.237
Trump had argued that the account could not be government controlled
224. Id. at 235 n.6.
225. Id. at 235–36.
226. A person “follows” another on Twitter when she can view that other person’s tweets
in her own personal Twitter feed. See Vangie Beal, Twitter Following, WEBOPEDIA,
https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/Twitter_following.html
[https://perma.cc/KKF7VA6U] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
227. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230.
228. About Different Types of Tweets, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/types-of-tweets [https://perma.cc/K9CL-Y57C] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
229. Leslie Walker, How to Use the Twitter @Reply, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-twitter-reply-3476763 [https://perma.cc/V6EY-7586].
230. Michael D. Shear et al., How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in over 11,000 Tweets,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/
trump-twitter-presidency.html [https://perma.cc/3JJN-2K7R].
231. Knight, 928 F.3d at 231. At the time of the Second Circuit’s decision, President
Trump’s Twitter account had “more than 50 million followers.” Id.
232. Id. at 232.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 238.
236. Id. at 236–39; Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 680 (4th Cir. 2019).
237. Knight, 928 F.3d at 235–36.
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because he had created it in a personal capacity before he ran for president.238
But the Second Circuit found that because Trump had “repeatedly used the
[a]ccount as an official vehicle for governance,” there was sufficient state
action to make the case amenable to judicial review.239
After finding sufficient state action for a First Amendment inquiry, the
court found that, by making its interactive features accessible to public
Twitter users, Trump had “intentionally opened” the account for public
discussion.240 Because he had so opened his account for discussion, Trump
had made that interactive space a public forum.241
The court conceded that the tweets Trump posted himself for governance
are government speech.242 Thus, Trump is under no obligation to maintain
neutrality when he tweets.243 However, the court maintained that Trump’s
tweets themselves are not the public forum at issue.244 Instead, the
interactive thread of replies where public Twitter users can post in response
to a Trump tweet was what the court considered a public forum.245 President
Trump had therefore created a public forum through his Twitter account
because he set up the account to allow other users to reply to and converse
with other such repliers.246
The court then concluded that, because Trump had created a public forum,
he had engaged in viewpoint discrimination when he blocked the plaintiffs
for posting critical replies within the public forum.247 By blocking the
plaintiffs, President Trump had burdened not only their ability to express
themselves directly to him but also their ability to converse with the
thousands of other Twitter users who post replies in the interactive thread
created by his tweets.248 By excluding users based on their viewpoints from
conversing with himself and others in the public forum of the interactive
Twitter threads, President Trump had discriminated against them in a public
forum.249
C. Morgan v. Bevin
In 2018, the Eastern District of Kentucky took on a similar case in Morgan
v. Bevin,250 when two plaintiffs sued Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin for
blocking them on Twitter and banning them from viewing his Facebook
account.251 Unlike the circuit courts in the Davison and Knight cases, the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 234.
Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238–39.
Id. at 238.
298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
Id. at 1006.
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court in Morgan held that Governor Bevin had not violated the plaintiffs’
First Amendment rights by prohibiting them from viewing his social media
accounts.252 The court concluded that the public forum analysis was
inapposite because Facebook and Twitter are “privately owned channels of
communication,” and a public official’s use of his accounts did not make
them public property subject to First Amendment restrictions.253 Thus,
unlike the Fourth Circuit in Davison, the court did not find that a government
official’s “significant control” over a privately owned account rendered the
account a public forum.254
III. RECONCILING THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ FINDINGS WITH THE COMPELLED
SPEECH DOCTRINE
Part III examines the First Amendment policy underlying the circuit
courts’ findings regarding public forums on politicians’ social media
accounts and assesses the private First Amendment rights of social media
companies in light of their internal structures. Part III.A assesses the
arguments about whether social media accounts of politicians are public
forums. Part III.B analyzes how these social media companies exercise the
sort of editorial control that the Supreme Court has held to be protected from
government interference.
A. Merits of Finding Public Forums in Elected Officials’ Social Media
Accounts
There are several legal and policy reasons to view the social media
accounts of politicians as public forums that provide protection from
viewpoint discrimination. However, some observers have rejected viewing
these accounts as public forums.
1. Arguments for Holding That Politicians’ Social Media Accounts Are
Public Forums
Proponents of extending the public forum doctrine to the interactive spaces
hosted on public officials’ social media accounts rest their arguments on
several bases. One argument for extending the doctrine is that social media
is now as essential for public discourse as town squares once were.255
Therefore, the interest in providing public forums to facilitate the free
exchange of ideas that foster democratic self-governance extends to social
media.256 In this view, the law must place greater restrictions on politicians
who wish to curtail the expression of critical viewpoints on social media
sites.257 Second, proponents of adopting the public forum doctrine contend
252.
253.
254.
1011.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1011.
Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 683 (4th Cir. 2019); Morgan, 298 F. Supp. 3d at
See Nunziato, supra note 12, at 59.
See id.
See id.
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that if public servants were allowed to block public followers or delete those
followers’ comments, it would restrict an important tool of citizenry in
modern America.258 Similarly, one of the attorneys representing the
plaintiffs in their suit against President Trump feared that failing to extend
the doctrine would allow public officials to “[pick] and choos[e] who is
allowed to speak” and thus engage in the most fundamental example of
viewpoint discrimination by choosing only the voices of their supporters.259
2. Arguments Against Social Media as Public Forums
Opponents of the courts’ adoption of the public forum doctrine for social
media accounts wielded by elected officials point to several reasons. Noah
Feldman, a professor at Harvard Law School, notes that Twitter and
Facebook are private entities, as are the individual accounts and pages of
each of their users.260 Thus, because these companies are privately owned,
there is no state action when a user deploys the privately created tools at her
disposal to block other users or delete content.261
In addition, at least one critic argues that insufficient state action exists if
an individual continues to use a previously private account once she assumes
elected office.262 In other words, if government officials have control over
their social media accounts, those accounts can only be public forums if they
were initially created by government officials.263 Lastly, and in a similar
vein, Eugene Volokh, a professor of First Amendment law at the UCLA
School of Law, argues that elected officials who run accounts in a personal
capacity do not act on behalf of the government to create a public forum.264
B. Social Media Companies Exercising Editorial Judgment
Facebook and Twitter exhibit their editorial discretion in four ways: (1)
through algorithms created by programmers that orient the information on
users’ accounts and feeds; (2) through algorithms that give users the tool to
remove certain content themselves; (3) removing accounts or banning users
entirely; and (4) by having employees directly remove and police content that
violates their policies. This section discusses each of these instances of
258. Robert Loeb, Blocking Twitter Users from the President’s Account, LAWFARE (June
13, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/blocking-twitter-users-presidentialaccount-0 [https://perma.cc/BB6N-5GGW]; see also Marimow, supra note 184.
259. Marimow, supra note 184.
260. Noah Feldman, Constitution Can’t Stop Trump from Blocking Tweets, BLOOMBERG
OPINION (June 7, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-0607/constitution-can-t-stop-trump-from-blocking-tweets [https://perma.cc/23L9-S6TF].
261. Id.
262. See Lauren Beausoleil, Comment, Is Trolling Trump a Right or a Privilege?: The
Erroneous Finding in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, 60
B.C. L. REV. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENT II-31, II-43 (2019).
263. Id.
264. Eugene Volokh, More on the First Amendment and @RealDonaldTrump, WASH.
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 14, 2017, 8:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/14/more-on-the-first-amendment-and-realdonaldtrump
[https://perma.cc/U35H-GEDE].
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discretion in turn, explores the private speech rules social media companies
institute for their websites, and analyzes the extent to which the First
Amendment protects these aspects of social media discretion.
Websites and search engines create algorithms to populate users’
searches.265 Even though search results are automated by an algorithm, the
search engine’s programmers have written the algorithm and selected how to
prioritize search results.266 Facebook and Twitter also have algorithms to
sort how users see content posted by their friends and family.267 This
digitized discretion is akin to human publishers deciding what to print and
not to print and is an instance of editorial judgment protected by the First
Amendment.268
Similarly, social media companies like Twitter and Facebook have
programmed tools that allow users to remove content, report content that
these users do not wish to see on their own accounts, and block other users
from viewing the information they post.269 This is what enabled Phyllis
Randall to delete Brian Davison’s comment and ban him from viewing her
page and what allowed President Trump to block his critics on Twitter.270
The companies’ programmers consciously designed these user tools as
another way to regulate the information that will appear on their sites.271
Therefore, the ability of any given user to block a follower or delete a
comment ultimately results from the companies’ editorial judgment to create
such an ability on their sites.272
Another relevant tool of editorial discretion that social media companies
can exercise is removing accounts or banning users. Twitter, for example,
has banned several prominent conspiracy theorists who posted hateful or
misleading content on the site.273 Twitter therefore inhibits and removes the
people who write and post such content.

265. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search
Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884, 888 (2012).
266. See id. at 888.
267. GILLESPIE, supra note 161, at 7.
268. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 265, at 887.
269. Basic Privacy Settings & Tools: Selecting an Audience for Stuff You Share,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242 [https://perma.cc/D4TQGTAY] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020); How to Control Your Twitter Experience, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/control-your-twitter-experience
[https://perma.cc/72PR-M4SH] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
270. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 231 (2d
Cir. 2019); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 683–85 (4th Cir. 2019).
271. Feldman, supra note 260.
272. See id.
273. Elle Hunt, Milo Yiannopoulos, Rightwing Writer, Permanently Banned from Twitter,
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2016, 12:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/20/
milo-yiannopoulos-nero-permanently-banned-twitter [https://perma.cc/3D44-66SZ]; Avie
Schneider, Twitter Bans Alex Jones and InfoWars; Cites Abusive Behavior, NPR (Sept. 6,
2018, 5:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/06/645352618/twitter-bans-alex-jones-andinfowars-cites-abusive-behavior [https://perma.cc/TU2M-6VD5].
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Social media companies also pay employees or contractors to rearrange or
remove posts themselves, rather than through algorithms or users.274
Facebook employs workers who select and prioritize the news stories and
content its users receive on their “news feeds.”275 Facebook also hires
contractors to monitor the site and decide “which videos count as hate
speech” or “are too violent to be broadcast” and thereafter remove such
posts.276 The employees at YouTube, the video-sharing platform, similarly
determine if certain videos are too graphic to be displayed to users who
enable “restricted mode.”277 Lower federal courts have begun to recognize
this direct removal as an exercise of editorial discretion protected by the First
Amendment.278
Facebook has its “community standards” and Twitter has terms of service
that function as the rules of engagement on the respective websites.279 When
social media companies set community standards and terms of service, they
define what sorts of speech the companies will permit on their websites and
what posts they will remove.280 Posts that violate these rules may be
removed directly by the companies’ employees or contractors.281
Some of these rules prohibit users from posting content that would be
unprotected by the First Amendment, like incitement to violence.282 For
example, Facebook will likely remove a post intended to incite violence
because such a post violates its community standards.283 This is analogous
to the power the government has to restrict the same inciting speech if it was
shouted in a public place.284

274. Chris Hughes, Opinion, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebookzuckerberg.html [https://perma.cc/G7GY-ARPB]; Sam Thielman, Facebook News Selection
Is in Hands of Editors Not Algorithms, Documents Show, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2016, 12:51
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/12/facebook-trending-newsleaked-documents-editor-guidelines [https://perma.cc/9JMD-6M8B].
275. Ramya Sethuraman, Why Am I Seeing This?: We Have an Answer for You, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Mar. 31, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/why-am-i-seeing-this/
[https://perma.cc/6XRX-3V4E]; Thielman, supra note 274.
276. Hughes, supra note 274.
277. Answering Brief of Appellees at 39–40, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 18–15712
(9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018).
278. See La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Jian
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Langdon v. Google, Inc.,
474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Del. 2007).
279. GILLESPIE, supra note 161, at 7.
280. See, e.g., Community Standards: Violence and Criminal Behavior, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/violence_criminal_behavior
[https://
perma.cc/HUZ2-DRKK] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020); see also Hateful Conduct Policy,
TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy
[https://
perma.cc/3YKC-P3HE] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
281. See Hughes, supra note 274.
282. See, e.g., Community Standards:
Violence and Incitement, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/credible_violence [https://perma.cc/YL7U89MV] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
283. See Community Standards: Violence and Criminal Behavior, supra note 280.
284. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
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However, these internal company rules restrict some categories of speech
on their sites that would be immune from government censorhip.285 For
example, Facebook states in its community standards that it will remove
content posted on the site if it is “cruel and insensitive.”286 Specifically,
Facebook will remove posts that are “explicit attempts to mock victims.”287
Such “cruel and insensitive” speech is likely protected by the First
Amendment from government interference.288 It does not belong in one of
the narrow, well-defined categories unprotected from government intrusion
by the First Amendment.289 Thus, by instituting a rule allowing the company
to remove “cruel and insensitive” speech, Facebook has decided that it may
restrict some content that is constitutionally protected from state
restriction.290
A theoretical example from the political world clarifies the gray area of
rules here. A Facebook user could have posted a comment on Representative
Gabby Giffords’s Facebook account after she was the victim of a shooting in
2011, seeking to humiliate her for the attack.291 That user likely would have
engaged in “cruel and insensitive speech” because she mocked a shooting
victim.292 Therefore, because the post would have violated its rule against
cruel and insensitive speech, Facebook could have deleted the post.293 But
if that same user orally mocked Gabby Giffords in a public park, government
officials could not stop that user because even cruel and insensitive speech is
likely protected by the First Amendment, unless the speech is obscene,
libelous, inciting, or uses fighting words.294 But because it is a private entity
that may choose its own speech rules, Facebook is permitted to remove that
content.295 Therefore, cruel and insensitive speech represents a category of
speech that is constitutionally protected from government intrusion when
uttered in public but may be amenable to Facebook’s own restrictions
because it violates the company’s private rules.

285. Compare Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (holding that the First
Amendment even protects speech that “demeans on the basis of race, gender, religion, age
disability, or any similar ground”), with Community Standards: Hate Speech, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech/
[https://perma.cc/E3DQDE7K] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (prohibiting hate speech on Facebook).
286. Community Standards:
Cruel and Insensitive, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/communitystandards/cruel_insensitive/ [https://perma.cc/PJ4A-6NR9]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1971).
289. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973).
290. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764; Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
291. Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, In Attack’s Wake, Political Repercussions,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/us/politics/09giffords.html
[https://perma.cc/BRT7-XHPG].
292. See Community Standards: Cruel and Insensitive, supra note 286.
293. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
294. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
295. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019).
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IV. POLITICIANS’ SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS ARE NOT PUBLIC FORUMS,
AND RULING OTHERWISE MAY COMPEL SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES’
SPEECH
Part IV concludes by assessing the circuit courts’ rulings and proposing a
resolution. Part IV.A argues that the Second and Fourth Circuits misapplied
the public forum doctrine to the social media accounts of government
officials because Twitter and Facebook are private entities that retain
ultimate control over the content on their sites. Part IV.B further argues that
these rulings have effectively undermined social media companies’ First
Amendment rights by restricting the ability of political users to remove
content or block users, an ability that the companies have created with their
editorial judgments. Part IV.C then offers policy reasons for why we must
understand these rulings as instances of unconstitutionally compelled speech
in the modern political environment taking shape on social media.
A. The Circuit Courts Misapplied the Public Forum Doctrine to Trump’s
and Randall’s Social Media Accounts
Twitter and Facebook are private entities.296 They are neither branches of
government nor controlled by the government; when they act, they do so
privately.297 Even if one assumes that Trump and Randall acted on behalf of
the state to block followers and delete comments, respectively, Twitter and
Facebook retain ultimate control over those decisions.298 It was the active
choice of those companies to give all users—including Trump and Randall—
the tools to block other users or delete comments.299 If these companies so
chose, they could remove those tools entirely.300 That a government official
exerts “significant control” over her account does not change the fact that the
blocking and deleting tools are ultimately the companies’ decisions.301
The decisions about what content will remain on the sites ultimately lie
with the companies themselves, even though independent users can block
others or remove content. Therefore, there is insufficient state action to
overcome the social media companies’ private status and to designate a
public forum when politicians delete comments or block users.302 The
control that public officials exert over the expression permitted on their
accounts is ultimately illusory because the companies possess such
control.303 The companies could even use their own discretion to remove
Trump or Randall from their sites completely.304 Twitter banned conspiracy
theorist Alex Jones in 2018 for violating company policies, completely
296. See Jackson, supra note 6, at 131–32.
297. See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353,
1355–57 (2018).
298. Feldman, supra note 260.
299. See supra Part III.B.2.
300. Feldman, supra note 260.
301. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 683 (4th Cir. 2019).
302. See supra Part I.B.2.
303. See Feldman, supra note 260.
304. See id.
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eliminating any expressive interactions that could occur on his account.305
Twitter could likewise decide to remove President Trump’s account, too.306
In this way, social media companies are much like the parade organizers in
Hurley, whom the Supreme Court held had a First Amendment right to
exclude marchers they did not wish to include.307 This removal power
demonstrates that these private companies retain ultimate control over what
expression may occur on their websites, not the politicians using blocking or
deleting tools.
Further, a private entity such as Facebook or Twitter does not become a
public forum merely because it is used frequently for expression.308 Just as
the private cable network in Halleck did not become a public forum by
offering a medium for expressive activity on its public access channels, the
provision of an expressive vehicle to users does not make politicians’
Facebook and Twitter accounts public forums.309
B. Why These Rulings Are Instances of Unconstitutional Compelled Speech
Even though the circuit court decisions may have protected some social
media users from retribution for criticizing politicians on social media, these
decisions may have been instances of unconstitutional compelled speech
because of the centrality of expression to social media and the editorial
discretion social media companies possess.
1. Expression Is Central to Compelled Speech Protection
In addition to the role it plays in the public forum analysis, the centrality
of expression on social media affects these companies in another realm of
First Amendment law: compelled speech. Litigants such as the plaintiffs in
Knight and Davison may contend that social media sites are analogous to the
shopping center in PruneYard.310 That is, like the shopping center, Twitter
and Facebook are the types of private entities that the government may
compel to host speech without violating the First Amendment.311 However,
Facebook and Twitter are distinguishable from the shopping center in
PruneYard for one crucial reason: their purpose is to provide an expressive
outlet.
The Court explained this distinction in Pacific Gas & Electric Co., stating
that the law at issue in PruneYard was not an instance of unconstitutional
compelled speech because it did not burden the mall owner’s own speech.312
Although the mall hosted pamphlet distribution, its purpose was commercial
305. See Schneider, supra note 273.
306. See Feldman, supra note 260.
307. See supra Part I.D.1; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).
308. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985).
309. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019).
310. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87–88 (1980).
311. Id.
312. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
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activity, not expressive activity.313 It was unlike a company newsletter,314 a
parade,315 or a newspaper,316 which are all inherently expressive in nature.
The fact that expression was not at the center of the mall’s purpose meant
that there was no editorial function or editorial judgment at the mall owner’s
disposal.317 Therefore, the California constitution compelling the mall owner
to host the canvassers could not violate the First Amendment in the way the
Court articulated in Tornillo—by “intru[ding] into the function of editors.”318
This is precisely what distinguishes Twitter and Facebook from the mall
in PruneYard.319 Speech and expressive activity are at the heart of these
social media companies’ business.320 As inherently expressive outlets, these
companies should be accorded the same protection for their editorial
functions as newspapers or company newsletters.
2. Why the First Amendment Protects Social Media’s Editorial Discretion
The editorial judgment protected from government interference is the right
to decide what content a company will and will not publish.321 When social
media sites algorithmically sort information, create tools for users to delete
comments or block followers, directly remove content, and suspend personal
accounts, they decide what to publish or not to publish on their sites.322
Through these various mechanisms, the content that remains on Facebook or
Twitter is at the discretion of the companies themselves.323 Therefore,
Twitter and Facebook exercise the “editorial control and judgment” over
expressive content that is protected from government interference by the First
Amendment.324 Lower courts have recognized that social media companies
have a First Amendment right to choose what to say or not to say, and they
can decide what their users can say or not say on their platforms.325 The
Southern District of Texas applied this principle to social media best when it
recognized that Facebook has a “First Amendment right to decide what to
publish and what not to publish on its platform.”326
One of the primary editorial judgments social media companies have made
is to bestow their users with the abilities to block other users or delete
313. Id.
314. Id. at 8.
315. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568–
69 (1995).
316. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974).
317. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
318. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
319. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88.
320. See supra Part I.D.2.
321. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
322. See supra Part III.B.
323. See supra Part III.B.
324. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
325. La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017), appeal
dismissed, No. 17–20565, 2018 WL 1224417 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018); see also Langdon v.
Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Del. 2007).
326. La’Tiejira, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 991.
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comments from other users.327 Twitter and Facebook consciously designed
these tools to regulate what content users can see and whom they can connect
with.328 If they stand, the holdings of the circuit courts could intrude into
this editorial judgment. Politicians may no longer be permitted to block
followers or delete comments from other users.329 The rulings would
therefore compel a social media experience for elected officials that diverges
from what the sites have designed through their editorial discretion. Further,
politicians may be unable to remove abusive content, even if it violates the
companies’ rules. Therefore, if the company does not remove the content
itself, abusive content may remain on political accounts. The rulings would
thus compel the sites to host speech that they have explicitly banned, further
abridging their independent judgments of what to publish or what not to
publish on their sites.330
The physical medium of the internet also means that these sites do not fall
into the category of companies amenable to regulation like the broadcaster in
Red Lion.331 Because there is no scarcity of space or wave length on the
internet that requires a government-licensed monopoly, Facebook and
Twitter are not subject to anything like the fairness doctrine to compel equal
space to all sides of an argument.332 If users are unhappy with the content
they observe on one social media site, they can simply go to another website
for the information.333 Therefore, these sites are much more like the
newspaper in Tornillo, the parade organizers in Hurley, or the company in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., all of which were protected by the First
Amendment from intrusions into their expressive activities or editorial
decisions.334
C. Why Social Media’s Editorial Control over Content Is Important
The tools that social media companies use to exercise editorial control over
content are not merely niceties that should be legally respected due to their
private nature. They are critical functions that keep the sites healthy for
users.
Harassment and hate are rampant problems that users frequently face on
social media platforms.335 Harassment is a particular problem for women in
327. See supra Part III.B.2.
328. Feldman, supra note 260.
329. Id.
330. See supra Part III.B.
331. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386–89 (1969).
332. Id.; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (recognizing that the internet
lacks the scarcity that justified regulations on the content of broadcast media).
333. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868–69.
334. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 576
(1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986); Miami Herald
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
335. Debbie Chachra, Twitter’s Harassment Problem Is Baked into Its Design, ATLANTIC
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/twittersharassment-problem-is-baked-into-its-design/542952/
[https://perma.cc/4DXW-NLZT];
Taylor Lorenz, Instagram Has a Massive Harassment Problem, ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2018),
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the public eye. A recent study found that over 7 percent of all tweets directed
at female politicians and journalists in the United States were either
“abusive” or “problematic.”336 This amounted to one abusive tweet directed
at these women every thirty seconds.337 Black women, in particular, were
84 percent more likely to be targeted by such speech than their white
counterparts.338
Another study showed that in the weeks leading up to her first election to
Congress, Representative Ilhan Omar, a Muslim refugee from Somalia,
received over 90,000 tweets directed at her Twitter account.339 Almost 60
percent of them contained either Islamophobic or xenophobic hate speech.340
The problem extends beyond abuse directed at women of color and
immigrants. A study by the Anti-Defamation League found that social media
users disproportionately harassed the Jewish community, including Jewish
politicians, in the months before the 2018 midterm elections.341
Because abuse directed at politicians on social media is such a substantial
problem, these companies need to retain discretion to police such abuse.
Given the sheer quantity of posts on their websites each day, it is nearly
impossible for Twitter and Facebook to remove all intolerable content
through their own employees and contractors.342 To compensate for their
inability to police all such content themselves, Twitter and Facebook have
made the editorial judgment to enable independent users to remove hateful
content or block discriminatory users.343
Therefore, by ruling that these accounts are public forums in which elected
officials cannot remove content or block users, the circuit courts have
disabled a necessary tool for politicians to combat hate. As social media
companies’ efforts to sanitize their content garners heightened scrutiny,344
taking away these discretionary tools, at least as they pertain to public
officials, is an unwarranted restriction of the companies’ First Amendment
rights.
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/10/instagram-has-massiveharassment-problem/572890/ [https://perma.cc/U8F9-PHXB].
336. Troll Patrol Findings, AMNESTY INT’L, https://decoders.amnesty.org/projects/trollpatrol/findings [https://perma.cc/XCT5-BQ3U] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Lawrence Pintak et al., Opinion, The Online Cacophony of Hate Against Ilhan Omar
and Rashida Tlaib, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/
05/opinion/ilhan-omar-rashida-tlaib.html [https://perma.cc/FZ4B-CC5L].
340. Id.
341. SAMUEL WOOLLEY, COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA, JEWISH-AMERICANS AND THE
2018 MIDTERMS: THE AMPLIFICATION OF ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT ONLINE 7, 12 (2018),
https://www.adl.org/media/12028/download [https://perma.cc/Y3CA-882Y].
342. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 161, at 7; see also Adrian Chen, The Laborers Who
Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings out of Your Facebook Feed, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/ [https://perma.cc/2S8F-DZCV].
343. Feldman, supra note 260.
344. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 161, at 39–42; see also Steven Levy, The Guy Who
Wrote Facebook’s Content Rules Says Its Politician Hate Speech Exemption Is “Cowardice,”
WIRED (Sept. 30, 2019, 3:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-content-standardspoliticians-exemption-dave-willner/ [https://perma.cc/8PFY-TANS].
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A potential consequence will be that social media users will gain a right to
“troll” politicians in bad faith, knowing that their posts cannot be removed
by the politicians.345 It is not as though these harassing users are necessarily
political constituents engaging in good-faith criticisms of their targets’
politics. The study of Representative Omar’s Twitter account found that
users from outside of her district had posted most of the harassing content in
the weeks before her election.346 Thus, the courts’ rulings may make
politicians more vulnerable to abuse and harassment from bad-faith actors,
not merely constituents seeking to provide honest criticism.347
Consequently, the circuit court holdings may deter politicians from ever
utilizing social media to communicate with constituents348 or might pose
steeper challenges to disadvantaged groups seeking to assert their voices in
the political process.349
Therefore, while there is merit to the argument that politicians should not
“[pick] and choos[e]” whom they will allow to interact with their online
accounts,350 it is ultimately more important to allow social media companies
to enable these politicians to police their accounts and prevent hateful
rhetoric that is of no civic value. The free speech interests of ordinary users
that these rulings protect must yield to the social media companies’ First
Amendment right to create a tool that enables users to protect and monitor
their accounts.
Therefore, if appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court should find that the
interactive sections of politicians’ social media accounts are not public
forums and that requiring politicians to permit all criticism on their accounts
unconstitutionally compels the speech of the social media companies who
have decided to create the tool to block users or delete comments. If similar
claims are brought in other district courts or appealed to other circuit courts,
such courts should reach similar conclusions.
CONCLUSION
As the circuit courts’ decisions stand, politicians who use social media for
governance cannot exclude social media users from commenting on or
viewing their accounts. These holdings significantly impact politicians’
ability to screen content, which necessarily impacts the ability of social
media companies to grant that power to their users. Acknowledging that
these decisions unconstitutionally compel speech would properly recognize
that social media companies possess editorial independence as private
companies and are protected from government intrusion by the First
Amendment. Protecting such independence under the compelled speech
345. Alexis Grenell, Should We Have a Right to Troll Politicians on Twitter?, NATION (July
18, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/troll-twitter-aoc-saladino/ [https://perma.cc/
V5DW-HBPY].
346. Pintak et al., supra note 339.
347. Grenell, supra note 345.
348. See Hidy, supra note 4, at 1083.
349. See Pintak et al., supra note 339.
350. See Marimow, supra note 184.
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doctrine is necessary to allow vulnerable political targets to screen abusive
content and to allow social media companies to facilitate healthy political
dialogue on their platforms.

